- Use PascalCase for classes, with uppercase acronyms.
- Use camelCase for function and variables. First word/acronym is always
lowercase, otherwise acronyms are uppercase.
Also, make the packet classes' `tag` properties `static`.
- Add `config.rejectPublicKeyAlgorithms` to disallow using the given algorithms
to verify, sign or encrypt new messages or third-party certifications.
- Consider `config.minRsaBits` when signing, verifying and encrypting messages
and third-party certifications, not just on key generation.
- When verifying a message, if the verification key is not found (i.e. not
provided or too weak), the corresponding `signature` will have
`signature.valid=false` (used to be `signature.valid=null`).
`signature.error` will detail whether the key is missing/too weak/etc.
Generating and verifying key certification signatures is still permitted in all cases.
- Rename `config.compression` to `config.preferredCompressionAlgorithm`
- Rename `config.encryptionCipher` to `config.preferredSymmetricAlgorithm`
- Rename `config.preferHashAlgorithm` to `config.preferredHashAlgorithm`
- Rename `config.aeadMode` to `config.preferredAeadAlgorithm`
- When encrypting to public keys, the compression/aead/symmetric algorithm is selected by:
- taking the preferred algorithm specified in config, if it is supported by all recipients
- otherwise, taking the "MUST implement" algorithm specified by rfc4880bis
- When encrypting to passphrases only (no public keys), the preferred algorithms from `config` are always used
- EdDSA signing with a hash algorithm weaker than sha256 is explicitly disallowed (https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-10.html#section-15-7.2)
* Rename `config.ignoreMdcError` to `config.allowUnauthenticatedMessages`
* Do not support creating sym. enc. messages without integrity protection
* Use `config.aeadProtect` to determine SKESK encryption mode
Refactor functions to take the configuration as a parameter.
This allows setting a config option for a single function call, whereas
setting `openpgp.config` could lead to concurrency-related issues when
multiple async function calls are made at the same time.
`openpgp.config` is used as default for unset config values in top-level
functions.
`openpgp.config` is used as default config object in low-level functions
(i.e., when calling a low-level function, it may be required to pass
`{ ...openpgp.config, modifiedConfig: modifiedValue }`).
Also,
- remove `config.rsaBlinding`: blinding is now always applied to RSA decryption
- remove `config.debug`: debugging mode can be enabled by setting
`process.env.NODE_ENV = 'development'`
- remove `config.useNative`: native crypto is always used when available
- Changes `openpgp.generateKey` to accept an explicit `type` parameter,
instead of inferring its value from the `curve` or `rsaBits` params
- Introduces `config.minRsaBits` to set minimum key size of RSA key generation
Also, switch from returning false to throwing errors in most verify*()
functions, as well as in `await signatures[*].verified`, in order to be
able to show more informative error messages.
This PR adds four config options to configure whether and how to load
indutny/elliptic: use_indutny_elliptic, external_indutny_elliptic,
indutny_elliptic_path and indutny_elliptic_fetch_options.
Also:
- Use tweetnacl.js instead of indutny/elliptic for curve25519 key generation
- Don't initialize indutny's curve25519, improving performance when using that curve
- Verify NIST signatures using Web Crypto instead of indutny/elliptic when not streaming
- Move KeyPair.sign/verify to ecdsa.js
- Move KeyPair.derive to ecdh.js
- Move keyFromPrivate and keyFromPublic to a new indutnyKey.js file
Previously the signature parsing function ignored critical bit on
notations.
This change checks for notations that are marked "critical" but are not
on the known notations list (controlled by config array
`openpgp.config.known_notations`) and triggers parse error if such
a notation have been encountered.
See: #897.
- In anticipation of streaming decryption
- Firefox 34 does not support chunk_size_byte > 24
256KiB is almost as fast as no chunks (although both of those can be up to
~1.5x slower than optimally using threads for very large message sizes).
The optimal chunk size would be something like:
max(data.length / navigator.hardwareConcurrency, 128KiB)
But we don't do so currently because
- We don't know the hardwareConcurrency of the decrypting machine
- Smaller chunk sizes are better for streaming decryption
