- `openpgp.generateKey`, `reformatKey` and `revokeKey` take a new `format`
option, whose possible values are: `'armor', 'binary', 'object'` (default is
`'armor'`).
- `generateKey` and `reformatKey` now return an object of the form `{
publicKey, privateKey, revocationCertificate }`, where the type of `publicKey`
and `privateKey` depends on `options.format`:
* if `format: 'armor'` then `privateKey, publicKey` are armored strings;
* if `format: 'binary'` then `privateKey, publicKey` are `Uint8Array`;
* if `format: 'object'` then `privateKey, publicKey` are `PrivateKey` and
`PublicKey` objects respectively;
- `revokeKey` now returns `{ publicKey, privateKey }`, where:
* if a `PrivateKey` is passed as `key` input, `privateKey, publicKey` are of the
requested format;
* if a `PublicKey` is passed as `key` input, `publicKey` is of the requested format,
while `privateKey` is `null` (previously, in this case the `privateKey` field
was not defined).
Breaking changes:
- In `revokeKey`, if no `format` option is specified, the returned `publicKey,
privateKey` are armored strings (they used to be objects).
- In `generateKey` and `reformatKey`, the `key` value is no longer returned.
- For all three functions, the `publicKeyArmored` and `privateKeyArmored`
values are no longer returned.
- When parsing, throw on unexpected packets even if `config.tolerant = true`
(e.g. if a Public Key packet is found when reading a signature).
- Always ignore Trust and Marker packets on parsing.
- Fix#1145: correctly verify signatures that include Marker packets when
`config.tolerant = false`.
- Rename `publicKeys` to `encryptionKeys` or `verificationKeys` depending on their use
- Rename `privateKeys` to `decryptionKeys` or `signingKeys` depending on their use
- Similarly, rename `toUserIDs` to `encryptionUserIDs` and `fromUserIDs` to `signingUserIDs`
Don't ignore parse errors if `config.tolerant` is enabled. This leads to
more useful error messages in most cases, as ignoring these errors will
most likely still lead to an error down the line (e.g. if a key binding
signature is missing). Unsupported and unknown packets and packets with
an unsupported or unknown version are still ignored, for forward
compatibility.
Also, make `PKESK.encrypt`/`decrypt` void.
- Add `PacketList.fromBinary` which parses binary data and returns a
`PacketList`. Using it instead of `PacketList.read` avoids being left
with partially read data in case of errors.
- Rename `toPacketlist` to `toPacketList` in `Key`, `Subkey` and `User`
classes
- In `readMessage`, pass down `config` to `PacketList.read`
- Add `config` param to `CompressedDataPacket.decompress`,
`AEADEncryptedDataPacket.decrypt` and `Message.appendSignature`
- Use PascalCase for classes, with uppercase acronyms.
- Use camelCase for function and variables. First word/acronym is always
lowercase, otherwise acronyms are uppercase.
Also, make the packet classes' `tag` properties `static`.
- Add `config.rejectPublicKeyAlgorithms` to disallow using the given algorithms
to verify, sign or encrypt new messages or third-party certifications.
- Consider `config.minRsaBits` when signing, verifying and encrypting messages
and third-party certifications, not just on key generation.
- When verifying a message, if the verification key is not found (i.e. not
provided or too weak), the corresponding `signature` will have
`signature.valid=false` (used to be `signature.valid=null`).
`signature.error` will detail whether the key is missing/too weak/etc.
Generating and verifying key certification signatures is still permitted in all cases.
- Rename `config.compression` to `config.preferredCompressionAlgorithm`
- Rename `config.encryptionCipher` to `config.preferredSymmetricAlgorithm`
- Rename `config.preferHashAlgorithm` to `config.preferredHashAlgorithm`
- Rename `config.aeadMode` to `config.preferredAeadAlgorithm`
- When encrypting to public keys, the compression/aead/symmetric algorithm is selected by:
- taking the preferred algorithm specified in config, if it is supported by all recipients
- otherwise, taking the "MUST implement" algorithm specified by rfc4880bis
- When encrypting to passphrases only (no public keys), the preferred algorithms from `config` are always used
- EdDSA signing with a hash algorithm weaker than sha256 is explicitly disallowed (https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-10.html#section-15-7.2)
Refactor functions to take the configuration as a parameter.
This allows setting a config option for a single function call, whereas
setting `openpgp.config` could lead to concurrency-related issues when
multiple async function calls are made at the same time.
`openpgp.config` is used as default for unset config values in top-level
functions.
`openpgp.config` is used as default config object in low-level functions
(i.e., when calling a low-level function, it may be required to pass
`{ ...openpgp.config, modifiedConfig: modifiedValue }`).
Also,
- remove `config.rsaBlinding`: blinding is now always applied to RSA decryption
- remove `config.debug`: debugging mode can be enabled by setting
`process.env.NODE_ENV = 'development'`
- remove `config.useNative`: native crypto is always used when available
