From 04eea5872c271f2d5155c2c0183ba9cc8f92c8f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Axon Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2015 06:02:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo --- common-tasks/full-screen-mode.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/common-tasks/full-screen-mode.md b/common-tasks/full-screen-mode.md index d309fcbb..dec41cbc 100644 --- a/common-tasks/full-screen-mode.md +++ b/common-tasks/full-screen-mode.md @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Normally Qubes GUI virtualization daemon restricts the VM from "owning" the full Why is full screen mode potentially dangerous? ---------------------------------------------- -If one allowed one of the VMs to "own" the full screen, e.g. to show a movie on a full screen, it might not be possible for the user to know if the applications/VM really "released" the full screen, or if it has started emulating the whole desktop and pretending to be the trusted Window Manager, drawing shapes on the screen that look e.g. like other windows, belonging to other domains (e.g. to trick the user into entering a secret passphrase into a window that looks like belonging to some trusted domain). +If one allowed one of the VMs to "own" the full screen, e.g. to show a movie on a full screen, it might not be possible for the user to know if the applications/VM really "released" the full screen, or if it has started emulating the whole desktop and is pretending to be the trusted Window Manager, drawing shapes on the screen that look e.g. like other windows, belonging to other domains (e.g. to trick the user into entering a secret passphrase into a window that looks like belonging to some trusted domain). Secure use of full screen mode ------------------------------