VMSudo: fix git link and formatting

VMSudo.md

@@ -8,9 +8,8 @@ redirect_from: /wiki/VMSudo/
 Password-less root access in VM
 ===============================
 
-Background ([/etc/sudoers.d/qubes](http://git.qubes-os.org/?p=qubes-r2/core-agent-linux.git;a=blob;f=misc/qubes.sudoers;hb=HEAD) in VM):
+Background ([/etc/sudoers.d/qubes](https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-core-agent-linux/blob/master/misc/qubes.sudoers) in VM):
 
-{% highlight trac-wiki %}
     user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
     
     # WTF?! Have you lost your mind?!
@@ -57,37 +56,30 @@ user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
     # be seen by the xinput program...)
     #
     # joanna.
-{% endhighlight %}
 
 Below is a complete list of configuration made according to the above statement, with (not necessary complete) list of mechanisms depending on each of them:
 
 1.  sudo (/etc/sudoers.d/qubes):
 
-    {% highlight trac-wiki %}
         user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
         (...)
-    {% endhighlight %}
 
-    -   easy user-\>root access (main option for the user)
+    - easy user->root access (main option for the user)
     - qvm-usb (not really working, as of R2)
 
 2.  PolicyKit (/etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-qubes-allow-all.rules):
 
-    {% highlight trac-wiki %}
         //allow any action, detailed reasoning in sudoers.d/qubes
         polkit.addRule(function(action,subject) { return polkit.Result.YES; });
-    {% endhighlight %}
 
     and /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/50-local.d/qubes-allow-all.pkla:
 
-    {% highlight trac-wiki %}
         [Qubes allow all]
         Identity=*
         Action=*
         ResultAny=yes
         ResultInactive=yes
         ResultActive=yes
-    {% endhighlight %}
 
     - NetworkManager configuration from normal user (nm-applet)
     - updates installation (gpk-update-viewer)
@@ -104,34 +96,26 @@ While ITL still supports the statement above, some Qubes users may want to enabl
 
 1.  Adding Dom0 "VMAuth" service:
 
-    {% highlight trac-wiki %}
         [root@dom0 /]# echo -n "/usr/bin/echo 1" >/etc/qubes-rpc/qubes.VMAuth
         [root@dom0 /]# echo -n "$anyvm dom0 ask" >/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/qubes.VMAuth
-    {% endhighlight %}
 
     (Note: any VMs you would like still to have password-less root access (e.g. TemplateVMs) can be specified in the second file with "\<vmname\> dom0 allow")
 
 2.  Configuring TemplateVM to prompt Dom0 for any authorization request:
     - In /etc/pam.d/system-auth, replace all lines beginning with "auth" with one line:
 
-        {% highlight trac-wiki %}
           auth       [success=done default=die]  pam_exec.so seteuid /usr/lib/qubes/qrexec-client-vm dom0 qubes.VMAuth /usr/bin/grep -q ^1$
-        {% endhighlight %}
 
     - Require authentication for sudo. Replace the first line of /etc/sudoers.d/qubes with:
 
-        {% highlight trac-wiki %}
           user ALL=(ALL) ALL
-        {% endhighlight %}
 
     - Disable PolKit's default-allow behavior:
 
-        {% highlight trac-wiki %}
           [root@fedora-20-x64]# rm /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-qubes-allow-all.rules
           [root@fedora-20-x64]# rm /etc/polkit-1/localauthority/50-local.d/qubes-allow-all.pkla
-        {% endhighlight %}
 
 Dom0 password-less root access
 ------------------------------
 
-There is also password-less user-\>root access in dom0. As stated in comment in sudo configuration there (different one than VMs one), there is really no point in user/root isolation, because all the user data (and VM management interface) is already accessible from dom0 user level, so there is nothing more to get from dom0 root account.
+There is also password-less user->root access in dom0. As stated in comment in sudo configuration there (different one than VMs one), there is really no point in user/root isolation, because all the user data (and VM management interface) is already accessible from dom0 user level, so there is nothing more to get from dom0 root account.