From 4138c85ec061549962876a0ef87c63dacda2ce8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Marek=20Marczykowski-G=C3=B3recki?= Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 16:16:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] FAQ: add info how to detect Qubes VM Fixes QubesOS/qubes-issues#1963 --- about/faq.md | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/about/faq.md b/about/faq.md index c666f9ca..375237bc 100644 --- a/about/faq.md +++ b/about/faq.md @@ -579,3 +579,8 @@ Arguably secure boot reliance on UEFI integrity is not the best design. The relevant binaries (shim.efi, xen.efi, kernel / initramfs) are not signed by the Qubes Team and secure boot has not been tested. Intel TXT (used in [Anti Evil Maid](/doc/anti-evil-maid/)) at least tries to avoid or limit trust in BIOS. See the Heads project [[1]](https://trmm.net/Heads) [[2]](http://osresearch.net/) for a better-designed non-UEFI-based secure boot scheme with very good support for Qubes. + +### What is the canonical way to detect Qubes VM? + +Check `/usr/share/qubes/marker-vm` file existence. Additionally, its last line contains Qubes release version (`3.2`, `4.0` etc). +The file was introduced after initial Qubes 3.2 and 4.0 release. If you need to support not-fully-updated systems, check `/usr/bin/qrexec-client-vm` existence.