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+---
+layout: wiki
+title: VMSudo
+permalink: /wiki/VMSudo/
+---
+
+Password-less root access in VM
+===============================
+
+Background ([​/etc/sudoers.d/qubes](http://git.qubes-os.org/?p=qubes-r2/core-agent-linux.git;a=blob;f=misc/qubes.sudoers;hb=HEAD) in VM):
+
+``` {.wiki}
+user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
+
+# WTF?! Have you lost your mind?!
+#
+# In Qubes VMs there is no point in isolating the root account from
+# the user account. This is because all the user data are already
+# accessible from the user account, so there is no direct benefit for
+# the attacker if she could escalate to root (there is even no benefit
+# in trying to install some persistent rootkits, as the VM's root
+# filesystem modifications are lost upon each start of a VM).
+#
+# One might argue that some hypothetical attacks against the
+# hypervisor or the few daemons/backends in Dom0 (so VM escape
+# attacks) most likely would require root access in the VM to trigger
+# the attack.
+#
+# That's true, but mere existence of such a bug in the hypervisor or
+# Dom0 that could be exploited by a malicious VM, no matter whether
+# requiring user, root, or even kernel access in the VM, would be
+# FATAL. In such situation (if there was such a bug in Xen) there
+# really is no comforting that: "oh, but the mitigating factor was
+# that the attacker needed root in VM!" We're not M$, and we're not
+# gonna BS our users that there are mitigating factors in that case,
+# and for sure, root/user isolation is not a mitigating factor.
+#
+# Because, really, if somebody could find and exploit a bug in the Xen
+# hypervisor -- so far there have been only one (!) publicly disclosed
+# exploitable bug in the Xen hypervisor from a VM, found in 2008,
+# incidentally by one of the Qubes developers (RW) -- then it would be
+# highly unlikely if that person couldn't also found a user-to-root
+# escalation in VM (which as we know from history of UNIX/Linux
+# happens all the time).
+#
+# At the same time allowing for easy user-to-root escalation in a VM
+# is simply convenient for users, especially for update installation.
+#
+# Currently this still doesn't work as expected, because some idotic
+# piece of software called PolKit uses own set of policies. We're
+# planning to address this in Beta 2. (Why PolKit is an idiocy? Do a
+# simple experiment: start 'xinput test' in one xterm, running as
+# user, then open some app that uses PolKit and asks for root
+# password, e.g.  gpk-update-viewer -- observe how all the keystrokes
+# with root password you enter into the "secure" PolKit dialog box can
+# be seen by the xinput program...)
+#
+# joanna.
+```
+
+While ITL still supports above statement, some Qubes users want to enable user/root isolation in VM anyway. We do not support it in any our package, but of course nothing can stop the user from making some modifications in own system.
+
+Below is a complete list of configuration made according to the above statement, with (not necessary complete) list of mechanisms depending on each of them:
+
+1.  sudo (/etc/sudoers.d/qubes):
+
+    ``` {.wiki}
+    user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
+    (...)
+    ```
+
+    -   easy user-\>root access (main option for the user)
+    -   qvm-usb (not really working, as of R2)
+
+2.  PolicyKit (/etc/polkit-1/rules.d/00-qubes-allow-all.rules):
+
+    ``` {.wiki}
+    //allow any action, detailed reasoning in sudoers.d/qubes
+    polkit.addRule(function(action,subject) { return polkit.Result.YES; });
+    ```
+
+    -   NetworkManager configuration from normal user (nm-applet)
+    -   updates installation (gpk-update-viewer)
+    -   user can use pkexec just like sudo Note: above is needed mostly because Qubes user GUI session isn't treated by [PolicyKit?](/wiki/PolicyKit)/logind as "local" session because of the way in which X server and session is started. Perhaps we will address this issue in the future, but this is really low priority. Patches welcomed anyway.
+
+3.  Empty root password
+    -   used for access to 'root' account from text console (xl console) - the only way to access the VM when GUI isn't working
+    -   can be used for easy 'su -' from user to root
+
+Dom0 password-less sudo
+-----------------------
+
+There is also password-less user-\>root access in dom0. As stated in comment in sudo configuration there (different one than VMs one), there is really no point in user/root isolation, because all the user data (and VM management interface) is already accessible from dom0 user level, so there is nothing more to get from dom0 root account.