Set to replace `enums.curve.ed25519` (resp. `.curve25519`), which can still be used everywhere,
but it will be dropped in v6.
Deprecation notices have been added to ease transition.
As mandated by the new crypto-refresh spec.
This applies to both the new and legacy EdDSA format.
For the legacy signatures, it is not expected to be a breaking change, since the spec
already mandated the use SHA-256 (or stronger).
The required hash size was determined based on the subkey algo rather than the primary key.
As a result, if the subkey being certified required a shorter hash size than the ECDSA primary key,
the issued signature would include a shorter digest than expected.
This issue is not expected to have practical security impact, and
it only affected keys with ECDSA subkeys with smaller key sizes than their ECDSA primary key
(e.g. NIST p521 primary key and NIST p256 subkey).
Due to a bug, a shorter hash could be selected, and signing would throw as a result.
This change fixes the issue by automatically picking SHA-256, if needed.
The same was already done for legacy EdDSA signatures.
Set to replace `enums.publicKey.eddsa`, which can still be used everywhere,
but it will be dropped in v6.
Deprecation notices have been added to ease transition.
The code used to wrongly consider e.g. x25519 keys without key flags as valid signing keys.
Keys without key flags are very rare nowadays, so this fix has low impact.
As specified in openpgp-crypto-refresh-09.
Instead of encoding the symmetric key algorithm in the PKESK ciphertext (requiring padding),
the symmetric key algorithm is left unencrypted.
Co-authored-by: Lukas Burkhalter <lukas.burkhalter@proton.ch>
Fix forward compatibility of keys, SKESKs, and detached/cleartext signatures and ECDH.
Relevant for forward compatibility when:
- verifying **detached** or cleartext signatures that include e.g. v4 and v6 packets.
Non-detached signatures are not affected.
- parsing messages with sym. encrypted session keys (SKESK) that rely on unsupported S2K types (e.g. argon2)
- parsing keys that include ECDH subkeys with unknown KDF params version
(e.g. end-to-end encrypted forwarding use-case)
Such keys are still capable of encryption and signature verification.
This change is relevant for forward compatibility of v4 keys encrypted using e.g. argon2.
Previously, `verifyAllUsers` would fail on keys with User Attributes.
Now, it returns a list of objects that have a either a non-null `userID`
property (in the case of User IDs) or a non-null `userAttribute`
property that contains the User Attribute packet.
Co-authored-by: Daniel Huigens <d.huigens@protonmail.com>
This config option allows parsing additional packet types when parsing
a packet list or armored object, in contexts where they are normally
not expected to appear, by passing a list of packet classes
(e.g. `additionalAllowedPackets: [PublicKeyPacket]`).
Most rules are derived from the `airbnb` template.
Some "bad" rule exceptions remain, but they require too many changes to fix, so
we leave it to a future refactoring.
